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Abstract 
In this paper, we firstly establish the core, fundamental concepts of Williamson’s TCE, 
examining the different governance structures or the institutional alternatives that TCE 
theory proposes. We go on to describe some critical considerations and theoretical 
proposals that correspond fundamentally to Williamson’s heuristic model, the 
integration of incentives in organizational forms, idiosyncratic demand, and how the 
concept of transaction is conceived in general 
Introduction 
The economic theory of transaction costs, as laid down by Williamson, stems 
from his interest in literature that explains how markets function, the way industry is 
structured and the various ways in which organizations work (Coase, 1937, 1972; Bain, 
1956, 1958; Arrow, 1959, 1973, 1974; Alchian, 1965, 1969; Demsetz, 1967, 1991; 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), considering markets and organizations, or the contractual 
relations between them, as alternative, institutional structures for obtaining efficiency. 
In Williamson’s modern-day version of transaction cost economics (TCE) (1975, 1979, 
1981, 1985, 1991, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008) nothing can occur without the 
presence of organizations. They are present in the level of competitiveness of markets 
(large or small numbers; Williamson, 1975, 1985), in the type of market (Robinson, 
1933; Williamson, 1975), and in the choice of institutional alternatives (Williamson, 
1985, 1991, 2003). 
The market alone is the economic space where different organizations and 
different agents concur, although the laws of large numbers mean that the market is part 
of nature itself. As a result, the explanation of the nature of markets (or the ultimate 
reason for the way they are) arises from the technological and organizational 
characteristics of the firms that make it up, and the individual (cognitive and moral) 
characteristics of the agents as members of those organizations or through their actions 
within the market.  The most influential authors for Williamson, with regard to the way 
he conceives organizations, according to Barnard (1938), are Simon (1947), Chandler 
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(1962, 1977) Cyert and March (1963) and Ouchi (1979, 1980). However, Williamson’s 
fundamental concept of idiosyncratic demand, which explains the existence of 
organizations and some of their most basic characteristics, derives from the application 
of his concept of specific assets to organizations. 
Specific assets are present in two facets in Williamson’s TCE: specific 
investments and idiosyncratic demand. The first concept, which has been described at 
length by the author (1975, 1985, 1991, 2003); and the second –one of extraordinary 
potency– has been used without being extensively or sufficiently developed (1981, 
1985). 
The former case is related to special investments on behalf of a single client or for 
a small number of clients, whose adaptation to other uses (to other clients in the same 
sector) implies relevant costs (non-recoverable sank costs). The latter does not deal with  
costs related to investment in material or tangible costs, but rather to costs that occur 
when the behaviour of agents (cognitive and moral aspect) do not comply with what has 
been asked of them (idiosyncratic demand).  
These two aspects of the theory, specific investment and idiosyncratic demand, 
together with the behaviour of agents, make up the cornerstone of TCE in the relations 
between firms (Williamson, 1975). In the backward relations of the client firm with 
suppliers, where investments have differing levels of specificity, relations will generally 
consist of productive activities on the part of supplier firms for their clients; and if the 
level of specificity is too high, the client will resort to integrating the activity (vertical 
integration in production; Williamson, 1985: Chapter 4). In terms of the forward 
relations of the client firms with other firms, in which there are different levels of 
idiosyncratic demand, the content of relations is generally made up of distribution or 
retail activities and the sale of products of the client firm by distributor firms or 
retailers; and if the level of idiosyncratic demand is too high, the client will resort to 
integrating the activity (vertical integration in services; Williamson, 1981: 1549).  
The nature of these two forms of specific assets is completely different. In the first 
case, integration occurs because one or both of the firms are not willing to take on the 
risk of the specific assets; risks that have to do with the hold up that can occur for the 
supplier due to the sank costs of the investment or shortage of supply suffered by the 
client. However, idiosyncratic demand refers to the risk taken on by the client firm due 
to possible free rider behaviour on the part of distributors or retailers, in cases where 
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these agents do not display the behaviour demanded for maintaining the quality or 
image of the brand name of the client firm (Williamson, 1985). 
In addition, idiosyncratic demand is related to strategic demand, as we can see in 
the evolution of railroad companies in the US (Chandler, 1977: 134-144 and chap. 5; 
Williamson, 1985: 277). Difficulties inherent in obtaining partners whose behaviour 
allows for a common strategy lead to the integration of different firms. Finally, in a 
more microorganizational approach, nothing that is technically separable would be done 
jointly in organizations if it were not for the existence of idiosyncratic demand. That is 
to say, if it were not for the existence of the purpose of coordinating and combining the 
activity in a common, simultaneous way with the same objectives in mind.  
In the following sections, we firstly establish the core, fundamental concepts of 
Williamson’s TCE, examining the different governance structures or the institutional 
alternatives that TCE theory proposes. We go on to describe some critical 
considerations and theoretical proposals that correspond fundamentally to Williamson’s 
heuristic model, the integration of incentives in organizational forms, idiosyncratic 
demand, and how the concept of transaction is conceived in general.  
Without the theory laid down by Williamson, none of the additions to the theory 
we propose here would be possible. However, once the theory exists and becomes the 
patrimony of the entire scientific community, these additions are an important means of 
enriching the theory, más allá del uso tradicional de la misma (Li et al., 2009; Un et al., 
2009; Palmer et al., 2010) o de otros conceptos próximos a la TCE (Safón, 2009; 
Warren et al., 2009). 
 
Make or buy decisions in backward relations 
The individual cognitive and moral characteristics in Williamson’s TCE 
correspond, respectively, to the concepts of rationality (intention) and opportunistic 
search in self interest (or opportunism). These concepts establish a conception of 
fundamental human behaviour for the theory. In general, if the limits of reason and 
opportunism are absent, this corresponds to a scenario in which plenitude and human 
happiness is possible; whilst if the limits of reason exist and there is the opportunistic 
search for self-interest, this leads to important difficulties for establishing agreements of 
a social, economic nature and, consequently, produces high transaction costs 
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(Williamson, 1985: 65-67) favouring backward or forward integration, or integration of 
a strategic nature. 
Williamson’s fundamental contribution in this respect is the existence of market 
competition amongst many: absence of specific, relevant investment and large numbers. 
When there is a large amount of supply and great demand in the relationship between 
suppliers and client firms, competition disciplines behaviour and corrects opportunism, 
establishing general conditions that the agents must accept. Such a situation enables 
agreements and reduces contract (or transaction) costs. The integration of activities by 
client firms in this case will be lower and the structure of the industry will be 
characterized by the existence of many supplier firms, bringing about greater 
fragmentation of the industry.  
If the opposite occurs, when there is short supply and a lack of demand in the 
relationship between supplier firms and client firms, weak competition does not correct 
opportunism, agreements are hindered and contract (or transaction) costs increase. 
Under such conditions, the integration of activities of client firms will be greater and 
will lead to more concentrated industries.  
The application of these ideas to distributor firms or retailers (the forward way) is 
not impossible. There may be industrial sectors in which there are many distributor 
firms or many retail firms that enable the end product or service to reach the consumer, 
whose characteristics imply a low level of idiosyncratic demand on the part of the firm 
that obtains them (client firm).  This would then imply conditions of competition 
amongst many, which, as we have mentioned, disciplines behaviour and reduces 
transaction costs. However, the low level of idiosyncratic demand necessary for this 
case will only come about with goods or services for which the level of quality or 
prestige of the brand name are not highly relevant, or when the goods or services in 
question are not easily exposed to deterioration in the forward way as a result of the 
inadequate behaviour of agents. If these conditions do not arise, the existence of many 
distributors or many retailers is insufficient because there is no market that allows for 
the verification ex ante the intangibles of the intentions or behaviour of distributors and 
retailers, in a general sense, the backward relation in tangible markets is of a different 
nature in comparison to the forward relation. 
Continuing with the backward case, Williamson’s fundamental contribution in 
this respect is the identification of the economic cause that leads to the existence of 
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small numbers: the existence of specific investment (or special investment carried out by 
suppliers for a reduced number of clients whose alternative uses imply relevant costs). 
These investments reduce the market to the scope of goods or services obtained via 
specific assets and, in extreme conditions, lead to a bilateral relation between the client 
firm and the supplier. Therefore, in the absence of competition as a mechanism that 
disciplines opportunism, transaction costs increase, making exchange more difficult and 
motivating the integration of activities within the firm, explaining the concentration of 
the industry.   
This is, a grosso modo, the essential contribution of Williamson to the 
understanding of markets and the structure of production in industry (in the backward 
way), in which transactions are the explanatory variable, and the form of governance 
and industrial structure are the explained variables. If the level of specific investment is 
low and involves transaction costs that are not relevant, the efficient governance 
structure for the client firm (in acquiring components or subcontracting activities) will 
be the instant spot market, supposing –as Williamson’s theory does in an explicit or 
tacit way– that the activities involved are technically inseparable and they have no 
relevant idiosyncratic demand upon them. This is the case of fragmented industries.  
If the level of specific investment is considerable, and involves transaction costs 
that can be assumed by both sides, the governance structure, in general, will consist of 
establishing agreements or safeguards via which the client firm will externalize 
separable activities upon which there is no relevant idiosyncratic demand. Agreements 
reduce the risk of suppliers (sank costs) and clients (stock shortages) and, depending on 
the difficulties inherent in the agreements and their costs, industries will become more 
or less fragmented. Lastly, if the demand for specific investment is very high, and 
contract costs cannot be taken on by any of the parties involved, the governance 
structure will consist of internally organizing the activity, though they may be activities 
in which the firm does not have relevant idiosyncratic demand. This will increase both 
the size of the firm and the concentration of the industry.  
The aspects described above pertaining to Williamson’s TCE should be completed 
by the level of uncertainty existing in the market, whose alterations enable or hinder 
(make cheaper or more expensive) contracts; and by the condition of recurrence, which 
corresponds to the number of transactions carried out within the framework of a 
contract, reducing or increasing the cost of unit exchanges. Thus, in what we refer to as 
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backward way relations, the relation of causality proposed by Williamson becomes 
complete between types of transaction and governance structures, explaining the 
vertical integration of the firm and the structure of industry (or the institutional structure 
of production), as Coase (1991) called it. 
Therefore, by making a crossover between the implications of behaviour and the 
level of specific investment, Williamson provides an explanation of the economic 
conditions that lead to differing levels of negotiation and transaction costs, and to one or 
other forms of governance structure or institutional framework (spot market, agreements 
and contracts between firms, and hierarchical organizations). If to this we add the levels 
of idiosyncratic demand, which are fundamental in Williamson’s TCE, we can represent 
the ideas reflected thus far in figure 1.  
In figure 1, we use the notation K = 0 when the level of specific investment is not 
highly relevant, K > 0 when specific investment is relevant but can be taken on by both 
sides, and K >> 0 when the importance of specific investment is such that satisfactory 
guarantees or safeguards between the supplier and client firm cannot be found. With 
regard to idiosyncratic demand (ID), it is labelled as ID = 0 when it is not relevant and 
allows products or services to be obtained via activities organized outside the firm, 
through the spot market or through agreements between firms; and the notation ID > 0 
when it is relevant and implies obtaining products or services directly from within the 
firm. Finally, we use S > 0 and S = 0 to denote the existence or absence of guarantees or 
safeguards. This allows us to explain branches A, B and C in figure 1.  
For K = 0 (branch A of figure 1) the governance structure is the market itself. It 
represents a situation where there is competition amongst many; a fact that, as we have 
mentioned, disciplines behaviour, reducing costs and making it desirable for firms to 
externalize activities.  We also assume in this case that ID = 0. For K > 0 (branches B 
and C in figure 1), investment is relevant but can be absorbed by both sides, and can be 
carried out without any kind of agreement or establishment of guarantees (S = 0) with 
the client firm (branch B), or by establishing a set of guarantees (S > 0) with the client 
firm (branch C, figure 1). We continue with the assumption that ID = 0 in branches B 
and C. The most common solution for establishing guarantees is the realignment of 
incentives, as some sort of penalty will be incurred if the contract is not completed, a 
fact that creates a specialized governance structure and introduces trading regularities 
that support and signal continuity intentions (Williamson, 1985: 34).  
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For K >> 0, once the level of specific investment cannot be satisfactorily 
guaranteed by any set of safeguards, the efficient governance structure for organizing 
the activities of the firm (branch D, figure 1), whatever the value of the idiosyncratic 
demand (ID = 0 or ID > o), will be the internalization. Such a situation opens up new 
internal possibilities, via differing organizational forms that represent variations within 
the firm’s governance structure or institutional form.  
Figura 1. Basic contractual map 
 
Adapted from Williamson 1985: 33 
 
We go on to analyze Williamson’s TCE, developing the governance structure of 
the firm in greater depth.  
Organizational theory, backward and forward relations 
Once we are dealing with the governance structure of the firm, branch D in figure 
1 can break off (in figure 2) into D, E and F. Williamson’s basic organizational theory 
can be summarized in what the author calls the hierarchical decomposition principle 
(1981: 1550), incentive ramifications (1985: 140) and the requirements or idiosyncratic 
demand of certain organizational units over others (ibid.: 275-277). 
With regard to the hierarchical decomposition principle, with a view to providing 
the solution to a variety of operative and organizational problems, and enabling limited 
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rationality to come into play (Simon, 1947, 1973), the total system of decisions needs to 
be made into relative independent subsystems. In the words of Williamson (1981: 
1550), it is necessary to group “the operating parts into separable entities, the interaction 
within which are strong and between which are weak”, whilst distinguishing, in 
establishing different organizational forms, between “temporal ramifications of a 
strategic versus operating kind”, thus grouping according to the degree of 
interdependence between tasks; and according to the problems they will have to 
confront, be they long or short-term.
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With regard to the ramification of incentives or the differences between varying 
types of incentives, Williamson states that markets are strict and unforgiving (high-
powered incentives), whilst organizations are compassionate with their members (low-
powered incentives); also highlighting the fact that high-powered incentives do not 
work well in organizations (1985: 135-140). 
High-powered incentives in organizations consist of measuring the performance 
of different agents according to the profit obtained, which is patently applicable to 
managers of organizational units whose income and costs can be examined separately. 
In such a case, the balance sheet is the deciding factor. However, this can have negative 
consequences for the firm. The balance sheet can improve by avoiding costs in R+D, 
reducing maintenance costs for technical equipment or other similar actions. Therefore, 
it will be necessary to apply low-powered incentives based, above all, on the 
observation of the actions of agents, which allows for a more complete assessment.  The 
cost of applying these less demanding incentives, as well as those inherent in the 
observation and description of the work involved, lies in the fact that it allows, to a 
certain extent, non optimal behaviour. However, (Williamson, 1985: 137), “it is in the 
mutual interest of firm and worker to safeguard the employment relation against abrupt 
termination (by either party) wherever labour develops firm specific skills and 
knowledge during the course of its employment.” 
Finally, the requirements or idiosyncratic demand of certain organizational units 
on others, or between the different, technically separable activities within each unit, 
constitute the very essence of the existence of organizations. The specific or 
idiosyncratic demands of certain organizations (organizational units or firms) on others, 
at operative levels (Williamson, 1985: 275) or strategic ones (Ibid.: 277), explain both 
                                                          
1
 Simon (1962: 477) is cited by Williamson as a reference for the paragraph in speech marks. 
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size and organizational form (Ibid.: chap. 11). However, it is important to distinguish 
between these two cases. (1) When the existence of free rider behaviour or the 
divergence of legitimate interests do not allow for the satisfaction of idiosyncratic 
requirements via partnership agreements with other firms, although both parties may be 
able to assume the requirements of specific investment   (K = 0 or K > 0 e ID > 0); 
which is a question of demands on the behaviour of the partner, not represented in 
figure 1. (2) And in a situation where K >> 0, which, on its own, explains the 
internalization of certain activities, the values of idiosyncratic demand (ID = 0 or ID > 
0) and internal safeguards (S*) lead to different organizational structures or to different 
corporate institutional forms.  
By taking a deeper look at idiosyncratic demand, figure 2 represents only case (2) 
as an extension of figure 1. We thereby reflect Williamson’s substantial contribution to 
organizational theory, and develop it further with ideas that are implicit in the thoughts 
of this author.  
Figure 2. Extended contractual map 
 
If we describe figure 2, in its organizational branches D, E and F, with regard to 
branch D, we can establish that part of the activities integrated into the firm are due to 
idiosyncratic demand  (ID > 0), while other activities will be integrated as a result of K 
>> 0 (although in terms of the latter, ID = 0 is possible). Equally, the centralized 
structure should be interpreted here as the dependence of all the organizational units on 
K = 0 
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the same hierarchical management of the firm (Williamson, 1985; Galbraith, 1993). 
Finally, S* corresponds to the safeguards or guarantees between the agents that, inside 
the firm, refer to the relations between the organization’s members, apart from 
hierarchical order, by the greater or lesser levels of socialization and commitment to the 
objectives of the firm (S* > 0 or S* = 0). 
Thus, branch D in figure 1, and the U-form type of firm it leads to, has as its 
essential elements a centralized structure and a level of idiosyncratic demand (ID > 0) 
that explains the (technologically separable) elements that constitute the firm before 
externalizing or internalizing activities, and the internalized activities as a result of the 
existence of specific investment with a high level of specificity (K >> 0). The 
internalized activities, apart from the core initial activities that make up the firm (ID > 
0), may be a consequence of K >> 0 and ID = 0, of K >> 0 and ID >0, or of K > 0 and 
ID > 0 (this last case, not reflected in figure 2 for reasons of simplicity, occurs when the 
demand for specificity that forces the firm to internalize is on behaviour and not on the 
goods that constitute the investment).  
With regard to branch E, which corresponds to the M-Form firm, the elements 
that differentiate this from the U-Form firm are its decentralized structure, based on 
each division having autonomy for organizing its operations and for certain activities 
linked to operative development, its relevant idiosyncratic demand  (ID > 0) between 
the different divisions that make up the M-Form (this is the fundamental reason for the 
existence of this type of firm, as each division exhausts the economies of scale and is, in 
itself, an efficient enterprise
2
), and the need for levels of commitment to the firm (S* > 
0), at least on the part of the top management of the divisions, ensure that the content of 
idiosyncratic demand is complied with. With regard to the fundamental structure of the 
M-Form, which makes it a superior form of organization for organizing incentives and 
information processing, (Williamson, 1985: chap. 11),  notations ID = 0 and S* = 0 
express situations that are not overly relevant here.  
Finally, branch F is a spurious organizational form. We could maintain the 
notation K >> 0 for the Holding firm, meaning that in the units of enterprises that make 
it up, a relevant part of its activities are a result of the existence of highly specific 
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 In large divisional, multinational companies this is obvious. The division in Europe of the Ford Motor 




investments; but in terms of idiosyncratic demand, there is no demand for common 
policies or strategies among the different units or “divisions”  (ID = 0) nor, 
consequently, are there requirement or a need for commitment (S* = 0) among the 
members of the different organizations (Williamson, 1985; Williamson and Bhargava, 
1986). 
Final discussion and conclusions 
One of the major facets of Williamson’s TCE is that the theory simultaneously 
explains the organization, markets and the contractual relations between firms, in such a 
way that each of these alternative governance structures can be understood precisely in 
accordance with the others. As we mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, 
nothing occurs in Williamson’s theory without the presence of organizations. However, 
we could equally say that nothing occurs in his theory without the presence of the 
market. In short, it is these alternative governance structures of economic activity–or the 
alternative institutional forms– that prevail in TCE, as a conceptual framework that 
attempts to explain the criteria for choosing the most efficient form of governance.  
However, in order to be able to choose, one must know the nature of the 
alternatives from which to select; and in this sense, what do the market and 
organizations have in common? What are their basic elements? How do they combine 
and what are their regularities?  
This article has attempted to provide answers to these questions by using, in 
backward relations, the concepts proposed by Williamson in the same order as 
suggested by the author, and in forward relations by using the concepts and forms of 
relation whose development is implicit in TCE. In the first case, a sequence can be 
established made up of high-powered market incentives as opposed to the low-powered 
incentives of organizations, and as a result, the desirability of externalizing activities, 
and as a compensatory force, the disadvantages that can arise for externalization when 
we have K > 0 o K >> 0. In the second case, first of all, relevant idiosyncratic demand, 
(ID > 0) is essential for the existence of organizations in their initial stages; and 
secondly, in forward relations, the demand for specific behaviour in distribution or in 
sales, or in policies and strategies (ID > 0), leads to the incorporation into the firm of 
new activities or new organizational units, whatever the level of the absence of specific 
investment (K > 0).  
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Consequently, relating the explanatory variables of the theory with efficient 
governance structures or with efficient institutional forms, which constitute the 
explained variable, we can establish that: 
(1) For ID = 0 (with regard to the additional activities that the firm might 
incorporate), K = 0 indicates the spot market as the efficient governance 
structure. 
(2) For ID = 0 (with regard to the additional activities that the firm might 
incorporate). K > 0 indicates the market with or without safeguards as the 
efficient governance structure (S > 0 or S = 0).  
(3) For K >> 0 (with regard to the additional activities that the firm might 
subcontract or organize within the firm), this K value indicates the 
organization of those activities within the firm as the efficient governance 
structure, whatever the value of the idiosyncratic demand (ID = 0 or ID > 0).  
(4) Finally, for ID > 0 (with regard to any type of activity, in backward or forward 
relations), idiosyncratic demand upon the behaviour of agents, linked to these 
activities implies that the efficient governance structure is the organization of 
those activities within the firm, whatever the value of K (K = 0 or K > 0).  
Aside from laying down the cornerstones, for TCE, Williamson has also laid 
down the essential institutions for its future development. In ensuing research, we shall 
continue to take a deeper look at TCE, both in terms of its theoretical development and 
in its economic and organizational applications. 
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